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Several attempts have recently been made to identify the key indicators of community
resilience and to group them into an overall resilience index. These studies support the
evaluation of the effectiveness of resilience during recovery, and they also help establish a
yardstick by which to monitor progress in resilience enhancement over time. We examine
existing resilience indices in relation to economic principles and evaluate their potential
to gauge and improve post-disaster economic recovery, with a focus on businesses. We
conclude that the majority of indicators in use to date are not necessarily pertinent to
measuring resilience at the micro-, meso- and macro-economic levels in the aftermath of
a disaster. Contending that business behavior is the key to short-term recovery, we
propose a framework for choosing appropriate short-run indicators toward the goal of
developing an effective economic resilience index.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Research on resilience to natural and man-made dis-
asters has long focused on defining the concept and on
case studies. More recently, interest has shifted to identi-
fying individual resilience indicators or composites of
them in the form of an overall index. These studies are
potentially useful for assessing what factors make an
entity resilient, evaluating the strength of this resilience,
and monitoring progress on its enhancement. Several
well-intentioned examples include Norris et al., Kajitani
and Tatano, and Cutter et al. [1–3].
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate and
advance the state of the art of resilience index formulation.er Ltd. Open access under CC BOne major conclusion is that many of the components of
resilience indices to date are not in fact important to the
resilience of individual businesses or the economy as awhole
during the early stages of the recovery process. We suggest
this has arisen mainly because: too many of these indicators
are borrowed from vulnerability studies, there has been an
absence of conceptual frameworks for the formulations,
there has been a lack of focus on businesses, evidence on
what actually has affected resilience has been overlooked,
and there is a bias toward indicators that can easily be
computed with publicly available data. We propose a frame-
work, based on economic theory and on empirical and
simulation studies that measure resilience effectiveness, for
the future choice of economic resilience indicators and the
compilation of a short-run resilience index.
We begin the paper with a discussion of economic
resilience and then outline a conceptual framework for the
specification of individual resilience indicators. We then
summarize some case studies and simulation analyses of
economic resilience. Next we provide a critique of resi-
lience indicators to date in relation to economic principlesY license.
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formulation of a short-run economic resilience index.2. Economic resilience
2.1. Basic definitions
We focus on a subset of resilience pertaining to the
economy. It is applicable at three levels: Microeconomic (individual business or household)
 Mesoeconomic (individual industry or market)
 Macroeconomic (combination of all economic entities)
The latter level overlaps with the popular focus on
“community resilience” (see, e.g., [1,4]) and represents a
more holistic picture. However, economists have long
appreciated the importance of microeconomic foundations
of macroeconomic analysis for several reasons. First, the
macroeconomy is composed of individual building blocks
of producer and consumer behavior as underpinnings for
macroeconomic considerations stemming from group
interactions. Second, behavioral considerations are best
addressed first at the most elemental level. These same
points hold true for community resilience.
We offer the following definitions of economic resili-
ence based on Rose [5,6]:
Static economic resilience: The ability of a system to
maintain function when shocked. This is the heart of the
economic problem, where ordinary scarcity is made even
more severe than usual, and it is imperative to use the
remaining resources as efficiently as possible at any given
point in time during the course of recovery.
Dynamic economic resilience: Hastening the speed of
recovery from a shock. This refers to the efficient utilization
of resources for repair and reconstruction. Static resilience
pertains to making the best of the existing capital stock
(productive capacity), while this aspect focuses on enhancing
capacity. As such, it is about dynamics, in that it is time-
related. Investment decisions involve diverting resources from
consumption today in order to reap future gains from
enhanced productivity.
An important distinction between economic resilience
and the perspective often found in engineering approaches
is the focus of the former on the flows of goods and
services (typically measured in terms of gross domestic
product or employment), rather than the stock of assets
(typically measured in terms of property damage). Flows
are direct measures of economic well-being (e.g., GDP,
employment). At the same time, they are more challen-
ging. Property damage takes place at a given point in time
but the loss of the flow of goods and services, often
referred to as “business interruption”, just begins at this
point and continues until the economy has recovered, or
reaches a “new normal”. Therefore, they are complicated
by individual behavioral considerations and public policy
decisions. Kajitani and Tatano [2]; p. 757 have stated that
“Resilience options are regarded as measures that help
reduce the business interruption after the physical damage
occurs to structures”.Referring to the ability, or effectiveness, of a resilience
tactic implies a level of loss reduction will be achieved.
Hence, the definition is contextual—the functional level
has to be compared to the level that would have existed
had the tactic not been implemented. This means a
reference point or type of worst case outcome must be
established first. Further discussion of this oft-neglected
point is provided below.
Another important distinction is between inherent and
adaptive resilience. The former refers to aspects of resi-
lience already built into the system, such as the availability
of inventories, excess capacity, input substitution, contrac-
tual arrangements accessing suppliers of goods from out-
side the affected area (imports), and the workings of the
market system in allocating resources to their highest
value use on the basis of price signals. Adaptive resilience
arises out of ingenuity under stress, such as Draconian
conservation otherwise not thought possible (e.g., working
many weeks without heat or air conditioning), changes in
the way goods and services are produced, and new
contracting arrangements that match customers who have
lost their suppliers with suppliers who have lost their
customers.
We provide an admittedly crude but operational metric
of resilience. Direct Static Economic Resilience (DSER) refers
to the level of the individual firm or industry (micro and
meso levels) and corresponds to what economists refer to
as “partial equilibrium” analysis, or the operation of a
business or household entity itself. Total Static Economic
Resilience (TSER) refers to the economy as a whole (macro
level) and would ideally correspond to what is referred to
as “general equilibrium” analysis, which includes all of the
price and quantity interactions in the economy [5]. The
market itself, when functioning properly, is a major source
of resilience at the meso and macro levels because it
provides signals of increased resource scarcity that indi-
cate where reallocations should best be made by indivi-
dual producers and consumers [7].
An operational measure of DSER is the extent to which
the estimated direct output reduction deviates from the
likely maximum potential reduction given an external
shock, such as the curtailment of some or all of a critical
input. In essence DSER is the percentage avoidance of the
maximum economic disruption that a particular shock
could bring about. A major measurement issue is what
should be used as the maximum potential disruption. For
ordinary disasters, a good starting point is a linear, or
proportional, relationship between an input supply short-
age and the direct disruption to the firm or industry. Note
that while a linear reference point may appear to be
arbitrary or a default choice, it does have an underlying
rationale. A linear relationship connotes rigidity, the
opposite of the “flexibility” connotation of static resilience
defined in this paper. Analogously, the measure of TSER is
the difference between a linear set of indirect effects,
which implicitly omits resilience, and a non-linear out-
come, which incorporates the possibility of resilience.
Also, while the entire time-path of resilience is key to
the concept for many analysts, it is important to remember
that this time-path is composed of a sequence of individual
steps. Even if “dynamics” are the focal point, it is important
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an activity level is achieved and why that level differs from
one time period to another. As presented here, static
resilience helps explain the first aspect, and changes in
static resilience, along with repair and reconstruction of the
capital stock, help explain the second.
We illustrate the application of the definition with the
following case study by Rose et al. [8], who estimated the
national and regional economic impact of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. The
researchers refined some available data indicating that
more than 95 percent of the businesses and government
offices operating in the WTC area survived by relocating;
the vast majority to Mid-town Manhattan or across the
river in Northern New Jersey. Had all of these firms gone
out of business, the potential direct economic loss in terms
of GDP would have been $43 billion. However, relocation
was not immediate, taking anywhere from a few days to as
long as eight months for the vast majority of firms. Rose
et al. [8] calculated this loss in GDP at $11 billion. They
were then able to apply the resilience definition provided
in this Section to estimate that the effectiveness of reloca-
tion as a resilience tactic in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks was 72 percent ($43 minus $11, divided by $43).
This study highlights the importance of excess capacity as
a resilience tactic. This more intensive use of resources is
also the theme of the recovery in the current great
recession in the U.S. and other countries, as employment
recovery significantly lacks the recovery of output. The
experience of New York thus signals a significant change in
approaches to disaster recovery, which typically empha-
sized prompt rebuilding. Coupled with stronger require-
ments for mitigation, and hopefully some general
accumulated wisdom, we are recovering less by reflex
action and more by intelligent planning (see also [9,10]).
2.2. Measurement of economic resilience
Several studies have examined economic resilience
empirically or with the use of simulation studies. The
major pioneer is Tierney, who surveyed businesses in the
aftermath of the Northridge Earthquake [13] and Midwest
Floods [14]. Rose and Lim [15] translated Tierney's findings
into specific micro-level measures of resilience of the Los
Angeles electricity system. They identified such factors as
time-of-day-use, electricity “importance”, and production
recapture as key to understanding why businesses that
averaged an X% reduction of electricity were able to
continue operation with much less than an X% reduction
in their production goods and services. In fact, they found
that these micro-level tactics resulted in a reduction of
business interruption losses by 90%, an amount consistent
with Tierney's survey responses.
Rose and Liao [12] also used the Tierney survey
responses relating to water service disruptions to evaluate
two major types of resilience: conservation of scarce
inputs and enhanced ability to substitute other inputs for
water. They integrated these findings into a method that
enabled them to alter the key parameters in the produc-
tion functions of a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model to ascertain sectoral and economy-wide effects of apotential devastating earthquake in Portland, Oregon.
However, these two resilience tactics are limited and
resulted in reducing losses by only a few percent. Macro
impacts follow from micro impacts of resilience through
general equilibrium effects (basically price and quantity
multiplier effects). These are more sophisticated than in
the standard input–output (I–O) model, which is based on
linear relationships that omit the workings of markets and
are unidirectional (typically entirely negative for basic
losses in the case of a disaster, and entirely positive for
resilience). The CGE model is able to capture the moderat-
ing influence of lower prices from reduced demand, as
well as the upward pressure on prices due to decreased
supply, where in this case the demand side was the
dominant one. The net effect, however, yields implicit
macro multipliers lower than the standard I–O multipliers,
in this case averaging about 1.9. This means that the micro
impacts of resilience are slightly greater than the macro
impacts (general equilibrium effects alone are equal to
1.91.0, the latter being the direct effect base).
Other approaches to estimating resilience have been
less evidence-based, but are still prominent in the litera-
ture. Several resilience factors have been incorporated into
FEMA's loss estimation tool—HAZUS (see, e.g., [16,17]). In
the Direct Economic Loss Module (DELM) they included
factors for individual businesses making up lost produc-
tion at a later date by working overtime or extra shifts
after their utility lifelines had been restored or after
building damage had been repaired. These “recapture
factors” were based loosely on a synthesis of the literature,
and the indication is that these factors are very high
(ranging between 50% and 98% for most sectors) for short
periods. That is, customers are unlikely to cancel their
orders for the output of disaster-sickened industries for
short periods of time, because they have inventories on
hand or long-standing supply-chain relationships. On the
other hand, this type of resilience is likely to decline over
time, and is likely to fall to zero after one year, if not after
several months.
The HAZUS Indirect Loss Module (IELM), includes such
resilience factors as inventories, excess capacity, and the
substitutability of increased imports and exports. How-
ever, there are no definitive estimates of the effectiveness
of these resilience tactics for all contexts, so it is necessary
for the user to access primary or secondary data to
specify this.
Kajitani and Tatano [2] used a survey to estimate the
resilience of Japanese industries (meso level) to various
types of lifeline disruptions from disasters. They found, for
example, that, for industrial sectors, resilience to lifeline
service disruptions was less than 10% for electricity, 38% to
71% for water, and 63% to 96% for natural gas. Their
findings represent the most definitive to date on a broad
spectrum of resilience tactics.
Several simulation studies have been undertaken to
estimate the effects of resilience on losses from disasters
[18–21]. For example, Rose and Wei [20,21] used public
sources of data to evaluate the resilience potential of such
tactics as excess capacity, inventories, and export diversion to
reduce potential losses from a shutdown of the Port Arthur/
Beaumont complex. The authors found that the reduction in
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implementation of resilience tactics, including ship diversion,
stockpiles, excess capacity, and inventories.3. A conceptual framework for economic resilience
We present a conceptual framework for an analysis of
economic resilience based on economic production theory,
an abstract approach to how businesses combine various
inputs to produce outputs to sell to consumers. The frame-
work is readily extended to how businesses interact in
supply chains, and in one approach, known as computable
general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, the economy is viewed
as a set of integrated supply chains. The operation of
businesses is still the focus of this approach, but their role
in backward and forward linkages with other businesses
can be examined in the context of the entire economy.
Interestingly no resilience index in any discipline of the
social sciences today has provided a conceptual framework.
We note that these approaches emanate from mainstream
(neoclassical) economics, which is not without its limita-
tions. It is often criticized for relying too much on optimiz-
ing behavior and equilibrium concepts. Below, we note how
it can be adapted to overcome some of these limitations.
Business resilience has two sides. Customer-side resi-
lience copes with the disruption (quantity and timing)
of the delivery of inputs, and pertains to ways to use
resources available as effectively as possible by both
businesses and households, i.e., it is primarily associated
with static resilience. For example, at a given point in time,
meaning with a given fixed capital stock, in the context of
electricity, or any critical input, supply disruption, resi-
lience is mainly a demand-side issue. In contrast, supply-
side resilience is concerned with delivering outputs to
customers, and could include the establishment of system
redundancy (a form of static resilience), but usually
requires the repair or construction of critical inputs (i.e.
dynamic resilience). Repair of the capital stock, or supply-
side efforts, are the domain of the input provider and are a
completely separate matter from customer-side resilience.
Government has both demand-side and supply-side
resilience features in a manner similar to business. Of
course, government at various levels plays a key role in
economic recovery, so this is an added dimension of
resilience in this sphere. Improvements in the quality
and quantity of emergency services can be thought of as
resilience enhancement. Increases in financial or in-kind
disaster assistance and the effectiveness of their distribu-
tion to the affected parties promote recovery as well.
However, the provision of aid can have disincentive effects
on resilience, just as it does for mitigation when those who
suffer from a disaster because they have not undertaken
mitigation are “bailed out.”
In addition to customer-side resilience, households
have supply-side resilience considerations with respect
to providing their own services (e.g., cooking to prepare
meals) or providing labor. However, household activities
are not counted in national income accounts and are
difficult to value, so supply-side resilience is less mean-
ingful for households.Resilience options for business are summarized in
Tables 1 and 2 following Rose [11]. Each table lists a major
category of resilience and provides examples. Each specifies a
prior action that can be taken to enhance each type of
resilience. Each table also specifies the extent to which the
resilience category is inherent and adaptive. In addition, the
applicability of the type of resilience to factors of production
is specified in terms of the letters capital (K), labor (L),
infrastructure (I), materials (M), as well as for the output (Q)
that they produce. Finally, obstacles to the implementation of
each type of resilience are listed. Capital letters associated
with each of these inputs or outputs represent a strong
relationship, while lower-case letters represent a weak one.
The same convention is used to denote the strength of
inherent or adaptive resilience which is denoted by the
letter X. For example, a firm can readily import all inputs
except infrastructure services and physical capital, which are
more limited because of their stationarity. Factories cannot
readily be relocated but equipment can be; thus these
variables are relevant to relocation resilience, but are limited
and hence connoted by lower case letters. Another example
is that inherent conservation is primarily already accounted
for by maximizing behavior, but we include it as at least
weak, because not all firms actually maximize their produc-
tion relationships.
Table 1 presents resilience strategies for businesses on
the customer side. The first category is Conservation and
examples include automated controls to monitor the flow
of inputs (e.g., water) to help make sure they are used only
in times when they are needed and the reduction of non-
essential uses. Prior action can be taken to promote
resilience by closing systems to promote recycling, such
as in the re-use of circulating water. Conservation is only
minimally inherent because economists typically assume
that most inherent conservation options are currently
being maximized. Thus, most conservation options pertain
to adaptive applications. All inputs—capital, labor, infra-
structure services, and materials—can be conserved. The
major obstacle is necessity of the input into the production
process. Similar explanations are provided for other resi-
lience options for the case of business customers.
Analogously, Table 2 presents resilience options on the
business supplier side. This includes a different set of
resilience categories in several cases. For example, delivery
logistics refers to the fact that suppliers must deliver their
products to customers. Examples include shoring up the
network of wholesale and retail trade, contingency con-
tracts with transportation companies, and planning exer-
cises. The rubric for prior action is “broadening the supply
chain”. These actions are strong at both the inherent and
adaptive levels. As with most cases of supply-side resi-
lience, they are applicable primarily to output. The major
obstacle in implementing supplier-side resilience is the
condition of the transportation network.
The inputs into economic activity noted in Table 1 serve
as the independent variables for a formal production
function in which the influence of several types of resi-
lience can be linked directly to them or to the production
function parameters. For example, Rose and Liao [12] have
shown how conservation is linked to the productivity
term, and how input and import substitution are linked
Table 1
Resilience options: business (customer-side).
Category Prior action Inherent Adaptive Applicability Obstacles
Conservation Close system to promote recycling x X K, L, I, M Necessity
 automated controls
 reduce non-essential
Input substitution Enhance flexibility of system X X K, L, I, M Specialization
 back-up generators
 cross-training
Import substitution Broaden supply chain X X k, L, i, M Transportation
 mutual aid agreements
 re-routing of goods
Inventories (Stockpiles) Enhance; protect X x k, L, i, M Storage capacity
 fuel supplies
 labor pool
Excess capacity Build and maintain X x K Dilapidation
 system redundancy
 factor-in risk
Input unimportance Reduce dependence on critical inputs X X K, l, I, M Integrated process
 decrease dependence
 segment production
Relocation Arrange for facilities in advance x X K, L, I, M Coordination
 back-up data centers
 physical move
Production recapture Arrange long-term agreements X X Q Capacity
 information clearinghouse
 restarting procedures
Technological change Increase flexibility x X K, L, I, M, Q Lack of ingenuity
 change processes
 alter product characteristics
Management Train; increase versatility X X k, L, m Pressure
 emergency procedures
 succession/continuity
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substitution (CES) production function.
The production theory framework presented above
reflects mainstream economics, but has its limitations (e.g.,
assuming maximizing behavior and a limited number of
explanatory factors). It is intended as a starting point and can
be enhanced by incorporating features of the behavioral
theory of the firm (e.g., non-optimizing behavior and more
managerial considerations) and bounded rationality in gen-
eral (considerations of limited time horizons, limited infor-
mation and limited ability to process it). One way to do this
is to add a managerial term to the production function.
4. Assessment of resilience indicators and indices
Below we assess several recent efforts to compile a
resilience index (RI). We focus on short-term aspects of
resilience, as we submit that at least in the short run (e.g.
in the first year after a disaster) business behavior is most
crucial to economic recovery. A summary of the reviewedindices is presented in Table 3, in which we include the
approach chosen by the various authors, the conceptual
basis of the index, and some sample indicators. The last
column highlights problems we identified with the pro-
posed resilience indices. The attribute “incomplete” indi-
cates that an index comprises some useful elements to
describe the short-run resilience of businesses but needs
to be supplemented with additional elements for a more
complete representation. On the other hand, the attribute
“irrelevant” denotes indices containing elements that are
unsuitable for this purpose.
It appears that many of the shortcomings of the
discussed indices arise from the fact that the component
indicators relate to general economic characteristics
rather than facets specific to the operation of businesses
in the aftermath of disasters. Many of these indicators
are contained in vulnerability indices, and the implicit
assumption seems to be that resilience is just the flip side
of vulnerability, and without much rationale for drawing
this conclusion.
Table 2
Resilience options: business (supplier-side).
Category Prior action Inherent Adaptive Applicability Obstacles
Delivery logistics Broaden supply chain X X Q Transportation
 shore-up network of wholesale/retail trade
 contingency contracts w/transport companies
Export substitution Enhance flexibility X X Q Transportation
 expand markets
 re-routing
Inventories (Stockpiles) Enhance; protect X x Q Storage capacity
 strengthen storage facilities
 pooling of resources
Excess capacity Build and maintain X X K Dilapidation
 system redundancy
 factor-in risk
Relocation Arrange for facilities in advance x X K, L, I, M Coordination
 move closer to customers
 field operations
Production recapture Arrange long-term agreements X X Q Capacity
 in relation to customer needs
 practice restarting
Technological change Increase flexibility x X K, L, I, M, Q Ingenuity
 change processes
 alter product characteristics
Management Increase versatility X X Q pressure
 project demand change
 prioritize goods & services
Reduce operating impediments Recovery planning x X K, L, I, M Cognition
 assist family workers
 streamline paperwork
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housing capital, equitable incomes, employment, business
size, and position access. Sub-component variables include
percent employment, percent home ownership, business
size, female labor force participation, and a proxy for
single sector employment dependence. First, hardly any
of these indicators match those derived in Section 3 above
from a solid economic conceptual framework. Also, few
have much to do with the operation of an individual firm
or the economy as a whole. Percent employment is a good
initial measure of excess capacity in the labor force from
which to draw; however, it does not take into account the
fact that disasters are able to draw additional labor from
neighboring communities either through market signals
(higher wages) or for altruistic motivations. Female labor
force participation is not a good proxy for labor supply
because disaster situations can readily inspire dramatic
changes in this variable (e.g., the major increase in female
labor force participation during World War II). Single
sector employment dependence is, however, an excellent
indicator of resilience at the macro level because, as the
authors note, a diversified economy is much more resili-
ent. The remaining indicators are much more tenuous.For example, business size and income equality are indi-
cators that cannot be enhanced in the short-run, or even
medium-run, aftermath of a disaster. They have little
bearing on the operation of individual businesses. It is
not even evident that they can affect resilience in the long
run. For example, it is likely that larger firms are more
resilient than smaller ones (but see also [22], for the
opposite finding). However, does this mean a community
should favor large firms? Moreover, there are some rea-
sons why large firms may not contribute as much to
community resilience, given their absentee ownership
and thus their likely relatively lower commitment to the
locale. The income inequality variable is very pertinent to
how households fare in the aftermath of a disaster—a very
important consideration, but not necessarily one that has a
great effect on businesses. Aside from the important
separate issue of equity, lower income groups do not have
savings on which to draw to maintain a reasonable living
standard, which, in standard economic terms, means
lower demand for goods and services, and hence lower
levels of economic activity. However, often this situation is
compensated by government and private philanthropic
assistance.
Table 3
Assessment of economic and community resilience indices.
Study Approach Conceptual/Empirical Support Sample indicators Problems
Cutter et al. [3] Adapted vulnerability index Success of vulnerability index Percent employed Incomplete
several case studies Business size income Some irrelevance
Equality
Bruneau et al. [23] 4 Rs framework Systems engineering Avoidance of losses Incomplete
Redundant capacity Includes mitigation
Stabilizing measures
Recovery time
Jordan et al. [24] Content analysis Prevalence of (sub)indicators Employment Incomplete
Home ownership Some irrelevance
Income equity
Single-sector dependence
Mayunga et al. [25] Capital-based strategies Extension of social-capital approach Household income Incomplete
Property value
Employment investments
Fisher et al. [26] 3 Rs framework Expert judgment Excess capacity Partly complete
Inventories Single case study
Input/import substitution
Norris et al. [1] Literature review Social psychology Diversity of economic resources incomplete
Equity of resource Process-oriented
Distribution
Burton [28] Based on vulnerability Hurricane Katrina recovery Percent employed Incomplete
Household income Some irrelevance
Business size
Rose [11] Production theory
macroeconomics
Several case studies Inventories
Excess capacity
Input substitution
Business relocation
Narrowly
economic
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rough proxy, and is somewhat connected to labor produc-
tivity, but again outside aid is likely to help overcome a
serious deficit of this indicator.
At best some of these indicators are applicable to long-
term recovery, usually a period of several years, but are not
relevant during the short-term, say, first year. Thus, they
are only applicable to major disasters. One defense of the
choice of several of these variables is that they can be used
to gauge some improvements in a disaster resilience index
over time. Still, improvement on some variables, such as
business size, might not be without negative side effects,
which are rarely if ever mentioned. They are also useful in
assessing the self-reliance of a community, which is an
important consideration. However, the bottom line is that
this set of indicators has many serious omissions.
Bruneau et al. [23] outline a conceptual framework for the
quantitative assessment and improvement of the seismic
resilience of communities anchored in an engineering-based
definition of resilience. Focusing on critical infrastructures
they define the resilience of both physical and social systems
as consisting of the high-level properties robustness, redun-
dancy, resourcefulness and rapidity (“the 4 Rs”), and apply the
concept at the technical, organizational, social and economic
level. In addition, they stipulate that key to their framework
are reduced failure probabilities, reduced consequences from
failures and reduced time to recovery. Resourcefulness is a
measure of ingenuity under stress that corresponds to adap-
tive resilience. Rapidity is consistent with our definition ofdynamic economic resilience. Redundancy is equated with
resource diversity (excess capacity). Robustness corresponds
to the effectiveness of mitigation in reducing the initial shock.
Bruneau et al. also provide some illustrative economic perfor-
mance measures: avoidance of direct and indirect economic
losses (robustness); untapped or excess economic capacity,
e.g. inventories, suppliers (redundancy); stabilizing measures,
e.g. capacity enhancement and demand modification, external
assistance (resourcefulness); and optimizing time to return to
pre-event functional levels (rapidity). Some of these proxies
match a number of business resilience options presented in
Tables 1 and 2 and address the microeconomic level. The
main criticism of this study is the rather broad definition of
resilience that includes the reduction of failure probabilities
and hence of potential losses through mitigation actions prior
to an incident. We understand resilience rather as reducing
the consequences of failure and assuring business/service
continuity under adverse conditions. Nonetheless, the frame-
work of Bruneau et al. [23] is one of only a few studies that
goes beyond a simple definition and superficial discussion of
resilience.
In support of community disaster recovery and to under-
stand the requirements for achieving a higher level of
community resilience, Jordan et al. [24] carried out a content
analysis of the scientific disaster literature to extract a set of
indicators to measure resilience. According to their study,
which tried to capture relevant indicators across the social
sciences, engineering and practitioner-oriented fields, eco-
nomic resilience can be characterized by employment, home
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These indicators overlap with some of those used in the RI
derived by [3] and consequently suffer from the same
shortcomings. The exception is single-sector dependence,
which is a good measure for how diversified and hence
resilient the overall economy is (see also the macroeconomic
level resilience discussed in [11]). Employment or income
equality would not have a major bearing on the economic
resilience of individual businesses or the economy as a whole
in the short-run for the reasons discussed before.
Mayunga [25] chose a capital-based approach to address
community disaster resilience and included five major forms
of capital in his analytical framework to develop a community
disaster resilience index: social, economic, physical, human
and natural. He defines economic capital as the financial
resources that people use to achieve their livelihoods and
hence proposes household income, property value, employ-
ment and investments as economic resilience indicator com-
ponents. Along the same lines he defines physical capital as
referring to the built environment and includes, among others,
the number and location of businesses/industry as a resilience
measure. Mayunga's choice for the proposed subset of eco-
nomic resilience indicators is in some cases directly linked
with vulnerability reduction prior to a disaster event, e.g.,
income that provides for insurance or access to loans to
increase the level of household preparedness or take protec-
tive measures, such as retrofitting etc.; investment that
increases wellbeing and reduces poverty. These measures
would, however, be excluded from our definition of economic
resilience as they are more pertinent to mitigation. Also, while
certain structural and business conditions would be required
to qualify for insurance, it would primarily be a mechanism
that transfers risk rather than reducing it. On the other hand,
the availability of income and property value (savings) could
speed up the community's recovery process and stimulate
economic activity. It would, however, not be expected to have
a significant effect on business recovery. The number of
businesses would be an appropriate sub-indicator for eco-
nomic resilience if interpreted as diversification of processes
and products, leading to the rapid substitutability of services
and goods or to cushioning the shock to the macroeconomy.
Similar to Bruneau et al. [23], Fisher et al. [26] con-
structed an index for critical infrastructure resilience. Its
purpose is to supplement protective-measure and vulner-
ability indices to aid infrastructure operators throughout
the risk management process in ensuring operational con-
tinuity. With the RI being a relative measure it allows the
comparison of resilience levels and the prioritization of
investments to increase infrastructure resilience. The high-
level components of the proposed resilience index are
robustness, resourcefulness and recovery as defined by
the National Infrastructure Advisory Council [27]. These
major components consist of indicator subsets of various
levels, which broadly correspond to some of the options in
Tables 1 and 2. Robustness, for instance, includes system
redundancies to compensate for dependencies between
critical infrastructures, as well as the enhancement and
protection of critical-product inventories. Resourcefulness
consists of both pre- and post-incident sub-indicators to
account for anticipation and adaptation. Proposed sub-
indicators include stockpiles and alternative/new resources(excess capacity for electric power generation, import sub-
stitution for critical products and mutual aid agreements to
broaden the supply chain), and training exercises in emer-
gency procedures and business continuity. The recovery
component focuses on internal and external coordination
aspects but also on the duration of business interruption
and the time to restart full operations as resilience perfor-
mance measures. In contrast to the other RIs reviewed in
this section that focus on community resilience, Fisher et al.
[26] narrow their study to critical infrastructures as risk
receptors whose management is aimed at maintaining
acceptable levels of operation under stress and speeding
up recovery. This approach is consistent with the way
companies address business risks to increase their resili-
ence to crises and consequently avoid or reduce downtime.
Norris [1] proposes a theory of community resilience by
defining it as a process that links resources that are robust,
redundant or rapidly accessible (so-called adaptive capaci-
ties) to post-disaster adaptation. In this context, resilience is
not equated with an outcome but rather with the process
that links the resources to outcomes. The study identified
four sets of networked community resilience resources:
economic development, social capital, information and com-
munication, and community competence. The economic
capital indicator was further sub-divided into resource
volume and diversity, resource equity and social vulnerabil-
ity, and fairness of risk and vulnerability to hazards. In
general, Norris does not propose economic resilience options
for individual businesses and only superficially touch upon
the economy as a whole. Equity of resource distribution and
social vulnerability (including different exposures to hazards
and risk mitigation) can critically influence how households
cope with the aftermath of a disaster from a psychological/
sociological point of view. They might, however, not neces-
sarily have a great effect on businesses. On the other hand,
the level and diversity of economic resources is a good proxy
of macroeconomic resilience, as it is an indicator of single-
sector dependence. A first translation of the Norris commu-
nity resilience framework into an index was undertaken by
Sherrieb et al. [28]. The authors confined their attention to
economic development and social capital variables for lack of
adequate specification and data for other features of the
broader framework. The effort is commendable in two major
ways. First, it narrowed the set of potential indicators
through an examination of correlations between variables
that indicated overlaps. Second, it attempted a validation of
the index against historical data. Still this index is subject to
the most of the criticisms of the various indicator studies
reviewed above, such as the lack of a microeconomic
theoretical foundation, absence of actionable economic vari-
ables, and reliance on an implicit equal weighting of
indicators.
In an attempt to develop a composite index of community
resilience to natural disasters and measuring disaster resi-
lience, Burton [29] proposes a comprehensive set of variables
that was validated against the recovery from Hurricane
Katrina. The economic resilience index subcomponent builds
upon the one of Cutter et al. [3] and unites proxies for the
level of economic resources (percent population employed
(including female labor), homeownership, income, sales
volume of businesses), economic diversity (single-sector
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ments per 1000 population) and resource equity (number of
doctors and lending institutions per 1000 population). The
usefulness of most of these indicators for measuring economic
resilience was already critically evaluated in this section for
[3]. The remainder also shows little specific relation to the
operation of businesses, which is not surprising as the
economic resilience subcomponent was created to draw a
picture of the economic vitality of communities rather than
that of companies. The number of lending institutions per
1000 population directly relates to resource equity and, as
such, affects the recovery potential of the community. It
would, however, have little bearing on business recovery.
The mean sales volume of businesses impacts economic and
livelihood stability and is, as the author notes, a measure of a
community's economic resources. It is, however, not a suffi-
cient proxy for economic resilience. For instance, sales volume
might not be affected by a disaster because it coincides with a
low-sales quarter due to seasonal effects rather than being the
result of resilience measures. The number of commercial
establishments in an area can be a measure for sectoral
diversity, which generally renders the economy less suscep-
tible to disaster impact and hence more resilient.
We also summarize the work of Rose [11] in Table 3.
Because this framework has been discussed in detail
above, we simply repeat that the major strength of the
approach is its grounding in production theory, which
enables us to identify a core set of inherent and adaptive
resilience options, several of which have been empirically
documented as being able to significantly reduce disaster
losses. At the same time, we acknowledge one of the major
limitations of the framework so far—it is narrowly based
on economic considerations alone, and would benefit from
being expanded to include non-economic factors that have
a bearing on short-run economic recovery.
The majority of the economic resilience indices discussed
in the previous sections is of limited use for gauging the
recovery of businesses after a disaster. Where indicators
relevant for businesses or other organizations are included
in the indices, they pertain to static or dynamic microeco-
nomic resilience. Implementation of these measures across a
specific sector would increase business resilience at the
mesoeconomic level. Only a few of the reviewed resilience
indices address the macroeconomy.
5. Outline for a short-run economic resilience index
Our analysis indicates that few resilience frameworks
and no actual indices adequately focus on business opera-
tions in the aftermath of a disaster. We contend that
business behavior, in relation to static and dynamic resi-
lience, is the key to economic recovery, at least in the
short-run. Thus, all prior attempts at developing a resi-
lience index, while applicable and useful for long-run
analyses (more than a year after the event), are less likely
to be useful for the short-run.
We now outline the development of a short-run eco-
nomic resilience index, focusing on business behavior, that
is intended to help gauge recovery potential in the short-
run. It is based on the framework proposed in Rose [11].
The key issues are: (1) if and how to combine resilienceactions at the micro, meso, and macro levels and (2) how
to weight the various components.
The first challenge is whether a single index can best
reflect the features of resilience at various levels of the
economic aggregation hierarchy. We suggest it is best to
separate the three levels first, and then explore ways to
combine them. At the microeconomic level, i.e. the level of
individual companies and organizations, a plethora of
actionable measures to increase economic resilience exists.
Following the reasoning in Section 3, business resilience
consists of resilience options on both the customer and
supplier side. While the former relates to coping with
disaster impacts on the delivery of inputs and making
effective use of resources, the latter pertains to ways to
guarantee the delivery of outputs to customers. Some of
these options relate to static economic resilience by aiming
at diminishing losses (excess capacity, input or import
substitution, etc.), while others facilitate speedy business
recovery (reduce operating impediments, management,
etc.) and hence belong to the dynamic resilience category.
At the mesoeconomic level, resilience options aim at
bolstering the market or sectors and include, for instance,
pricing mechanisms or information pooling. As discussed
in Rose [11], market prices possess an “inherent resilience”
as pricing enables goods and services to be redirected after
a disaster to reflect highest value use. As another example,
information clearing houses could be beneficial to help
suppliers/customers in situations where, due to disaster,
the usual customer/supplier base is (temporarily) lost or
reduced.
At the macroeconomic level, resilience is very much
influenced by interdependencies between sectors. Conse-
quently, macroeconomic resilience is not only a function of
resilience measures implemented by single businesses, but
it is determined by the actions taken by all individual
companies and markets including their interaction. Appro-
priate sample resilience performance measures at the
macro-level would be, e.g., economic diversity to buffer
impacts on individual sectors, or geographic proximity to
economies not affected by disaster to facilitate access to
goods or aid. We should note that we have analyzed the
various levels of resilience but have not explored synergies
or interactions very much beyond multiplier effects that
translate major features of micro- and meso-level resili-
ence into macroeconomic resilience.
The second consideration is how to evaluate the rela-
tive contribution of each resilience tactic (each measured
as a single indicator) to overlap resilience. This issue of
“weighting” has been finessed in nearly all prior cases.
Several approaches for assigning weights to single indica-
tors are discussed in the literature (e.g., [25]). For instance,
weights can be derived empirically, e.g. using surveys, or,
as a fall back, from a theoretical model of the indicator to
be measured. An alternative way to assign weights is by
consensus or relevance with respect to specific policy
initiatives. We propose that the best way to develop
weights is based on evidence of the relative effectiveness
of each type of resilience tactic in actual practice. For
example, if relocation has been found to have reduced
losses five times more than conservation of scarce
resources, then the former might be given a weight five
A. Rose, E. Krausmann / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 5 (2013) 73–8382times as great as the latter. Of course, one needs to be sure
of causation, and this is not always easy given extenuating
circumstances that arise in real world situations. Our
economic framework does provide a structure, so that
the identification of indicators will not just be a fishing
expedition.
The weights would then have to be adjusted for differ-
ences in the context in which the index is to be applied, if it
differs, and it likely will, from the original case. There is no
one-size-fits-all approach to deriving weights, and the
method of choice will depend on the particular problem
at hand. It is best for each firm, household, government
agency or emergency manager to derive or adapt weights,
in addition to indicators according to local conditions.
Policy needs to focus on the variables most likely to lead
to successful recovery, and we have endeavored to present
a framework and some guidelines for doing so.
Since resilience indices are relatively new and disasters
infrequent, there has not yet been a case to test the
contribution that this new construct can offer. But there
are many examples of learning from experience in antici-
pation of future disasters, which would basically be
embodied in disaster indices. For example, after suffering
power outages from the Northridge Earthquake in 1994,
many businesses and households in the Los Angeles area
purchased portable electricity generators. These helped
reduce losses significantly during the power outages
caused by electricity deregulation gone awry in the early
2001–02. Sheffi [30] provides numerous examples of
success stories of businesses that have been resilient in
comparison to those that have not (e.g., mobile phone
companies Nokia vs. Ericsson in response to a disruption of
computer chip supplies in 2000). Actions that effectively
reduce losses are a basis for indicator choice, and the
compilation of an index helps bring this together, and, if
weights are properly estimated, serve as basis for prior-
itizing options. Of course, not all firms learn from experi-
ence. Flynn [31] found that businesses founded after the
Red River Floods of 1997 actually were much more likely
to develop disaster recovery plans than were firms that
had actually experienced the floods. However, a resilience
index may make their options more vivid and spur more
firms to plan ahead.
6. Conclusions
We have undertaken an evaluation of resilience indices
from the perspective of their potential to measure and
guide economic recovery in the aftermath of a disaster. We
have focused on several component resilience indicators
often placed in the “economics” category, broadly defined,
in terms of their actual effects on recovery. Examples
include literacy rates, unevenness of the income distribu-
tion, and percentage disabled. While all of these are
worthy social goals, it is unlikely any of them would help
any given business utilize its resources much more effi-
ciently or recover more rapidly in the short-run. Of course,
these three indicators, and others like them, do factor into
overall economic development and the quality of life, and
are definitely worthy of consideration for long-run com-
munity resilience indices.At the same time, it is only fair to note that economics
is only one part of the recovery from disasters. We are not
suggesting economics in general, or the mainstream (neo-
classical) approach used here, is the only thing that
matters in recovery from disasters, even just economic
recovery. In addition to the importance of non-economic
factors, we also need to consider the existence of market
failure, such as pollution, where the interests of business
are not necessarily consistent with the interests of the
community as a whole. In our context this is exemplified
by the possibility that the dispersal of toxic waste or
ordinary pollutants might be accelerated by more rapid
recovery, partly because environmental concerns may be
given lower priority. One approach is to go beyond
ordinary market-based economic indicators, such as gross
domestic product (GDP), and utilize broader measures of
economic well-being. Fortunately, there has been a great
deal of progress in these directions, even among econo-
mists (see, e.g., [32]).
A major reason to construct a resilience index is not only
to study the recovery process, but also to improve it. This
speaks to the importance of actionable variables. Several
indicators included in resilience indices refer to background
conditions and general trends that can hardly be improved
in the near-term aftermath. Moreover, improvement of
some of them is not necessarily consistent with other
economic goals. For example, diversification of the economy
may come at the cost of some economic activity. This refers
to the age-old tradeoff between risk and return, where
diversification is a risk reduction strategy. However, this is
not to suggest diversification is not a worthwhile considera-
tion, but just that one need consider its downsides. Beyond
that, some of the other indicators need to be acknowledged
as very much being immutable during the key period in
which business take resilient actions. Examples would
include literacy rates, percent disabled, and percent minor-
ity population. More research is needed to replace these
indicators with ones that really matter to economic resi-
lience and can be implemented in the short-run.
In order to identify more actionable resilience tactics
and address the issue of weights, more empirical work is
needed. Moreover, nearly all attempts to measure the
effectiveness of resilience tactics have been in industria-
lized countries, so studies are needed for the different
context found in developing countries.
Resilience measures adopted prior to a disaster may
come at a cost, but they make recovery easier. Indicators
can be very useful to gauge the capacity levels of various
types of resilience and improvements in them over time.
They can also be a useful first step in evaluating expendi-
tures on resilience as part of overall risk management. The
framework presented here provides the basis for cost-
effective analysis across various types of resilience for
comparison with other approaches to risk reduction, such
as mitigation and insurance.Acknowledgments
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